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Old 02-18-2018, 05:38 PM
eripiomundus (Offline)
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After reading "The Red Pill" thread and watching a few links to the Sam Harris and Jordan Peterson podcast, I thought it might be interesting to talk about truth.

My position: there is no truth except this sentence but, for practical purposes, it is reasonable to behave as if there were.

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Old 02-18-2018, 06:47 PM
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There are plenty of facts - all inescapable and unchangeable - whether we know them or not. Facts are true. When you deal with whatever portion of the relevant facts you know, as honestly as you can, you're being truthful.
There is no one big knowable Truth; just lots of pixels and fractals of truth.
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Old 02-18-2018, 06:54 PM
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I don't think it's as simple as that, so I invite you to name something you consider true and we'll see if we can veritably establish it as a fact.
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Old 02-18-2018, 07:01 PM
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Originally Posted by eripiomundus View Post
I don't think it's as simple as that, so I invite you to name something you consider true and we'll see if we can veritably establish it as a fact.


Sounds silly, but I just put my hand down my pants and scratched my balls. That’s a fact. And my telling you that is a truth.


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Old 02-18-2018, 07:04 PM
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Originally Posted by eripiomundus View Post
I don't think it's as simple as that, so I invite you to name something you consider true and we'll see if we can veritably establish it as a fact.


And I think P said it exactly right. Now, when we get into causal relationships between things facts get dicey, but an honest expression of the best available data will be truth. It may not end up being fact, but it’s the truth as we know it so far.


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Old 02-18-2018, 07:38 PM
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Youll have to forgive me for this I thought an extended passage from Heidegger would be relevant Ill post my own thoughts later (Im busy on me novel ). WB doesnt seem to support Greek characters (thats all that gobbledigook) so here is the link http://pdf-objects.com/files/Heidegg...kwell-1962.pdf pages 257 to 270

44· Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth From time immemorial, philosophy has associated truth and Being. Parmenides was the first to discover the Being of entities, and he 'identified' Being with the perceptive understandmg of Being: T6 y4p aV76 vo�;iv �crrlv T�< Ka��;tva,.= Aristotle, in ou�ning the history of how the &.pxal have 213 been uncovered,=temphasizes that the philosophers before him, under the guidance of 'the things themselves' have been compelled to inquire further: aV76 T6 1rpB.yJLa JJooTTol"lut"V aV7oiS' Ka� uvv71v&yKau�; '"lT�<iv.xxU He is describing the same fact when he says that&.vayKa,OJL�<VOS'O'dKo..\ov8�;iv Tois cfoawoJLlvo,sJtXUt__that he (Parmenides) was compelled to follow that which showed itself in itself: In another passage he remarks that these thinkers carried on their researches {m' aVTfjS' TfjS' &...\"18�<las &.vayKa'OJL�<Vo,xxiv-"compelled by the 'truth' itself". Aristotle describes these researches as .p,..\ouocfo�;iv TT�<p� TfjS' &...\"18�;las=v-" 'philosophizing' about the 'truth' "--or even as &.7rocfoalv�;u8a, TT�<p� TfjS' &...\"18�;las=vt_a_s exhibiting something and letting it be seen with regard to the 'truth' and within the range of the 'truth'. Philosophy itself is defined as �mcrr'J]JL"l TfjS' d..\"18�<las=vtt__"the science of the 'truth' ". But it is also characterized as �mcrr�JL"l, � 8�;wpt;i T6 �v D �vJtXVUL_ as "a science which contemplates entities as entities"-that is, with regard to their Being. What is signified here by 'carrying on researches into the "truth" ', by "science of the 'truth' " ? In such researches is 'truth' made a theme as it would be in a theory of knowledge or of judgment? Manifestly not, fo r 'truth' signifies the same as 'thing' ["Sache"], 'something that shows itself'. But what then does the expression 'truth' signify if it can be used as a term fo r 'entity' and 'Being'? If, however, truth rightfully has a primordial connection with Being, then the phenomenon of truth comes within the range of the problematic of fundamental ontology. In that case, must not this phenomenon have been encountered already within our preparatory fundamental analysis, the analytic of Dasein? What ontico-ontological connection does 'truth' have with Dasein and with that ontical characteristic of Dasein which we call the "understanding ofBeing"? Can the reason why Being necessarily goes together with truth and vice versa be pointed out in terms of such understanding? These questions are not to be evaded. Because Being does indeed 'go together' with truth, the phenomenon of truth has already been one of the themes of our earlier analyses, though not explicitly under this title. In
I. 6 Being and Time giving precision to the problem of Being, it is now time to delimit the phenomenon of truth explicitly and to fix the problems which it comprises. In doing this, we should not just take together what we have previously 214 taken apart. Our investigation requires a new approach. Our analysis takes its departure from the traditional conception of truth, and attempts to lay bare the ontological foundations of that conception (a). In terms of these foundations the primordial phenomenon of truth becomes visible. We can then exhibit the way in which the traditional conception of truth has been derived from this phenomenon (b). Qur investigation will make it plain that to the question of the 'essence' 'of truth, there belongs necessarily the question of the kind of Being which truth possesses. Together with this we must clarify the ontological meaning of the kind of talk in which we say that 'there is truth', and we must also clarify the kind of necessity with which 'we must presuppose' that 'there is' truth (c). (a) The Traditional Conception of Truth, and its Ontological Foundations There are three theses which characterize the way in which the essence of truth has been traditionally taken and the way it is supposed to have been first defined: (1) that the 'locus' of truth is assertion (judgment) ; (2) that the essence of truth lies in the 'agreement' of th� judgment with its object; (3) that Aristotle, the father of logic, not only has assigned truth to the judgment as its primordial locus but has set going the definition of "truth" as 'agreement' .1 Here it is not our aim to provide a history of the concept of truth, which could be presented only on the basis of a history of ontology. We shall introduce our analytical discussions by alluding to some fa miliar matters. Aristotle says that the 7TaO�p,ara Tfj!; ifivxfj!; are TWV 7Tpayp,arwv op,oulJp.araXXix_that the soul's 'Experiences', its vo�p,ara ('representations'), are likenings of Things. This assertion, which is by no means proposed as an explicit definition of the essence of truth, has also given occasion for developing the later formulation of the essence of truth 'as adaequatio intellectus et rei. 2 Thomas Aquinas,xxx who refers this definition to Avicenna (who, in turn, has taken it over from Isaac Israeli's tenth-century 'Book of Definitions') also uses fo r "adaequatio" (likening) the terms "correspondentia" ("correspondence") and "convenientia" (" coming together"). 1 Here we follow the older editions in reading ' ... hat sowohl die Wahrheit dem Urteil als ihrem urspriinglichen Ort zugewiesen als auch die Definition der Wahrheit als "Ubereinstimmung" in Gang gebracht.' The newer editions read ' ..• hat sowohl •.. zugewiesen, er hat auch .. .' 2 This is usually translated as 'adequation of the intellect and the thing'. Heidegger makes the connection seem closer by translating both the Latin adaequatio and the Greek OJLolwp.a by the word 'Angleichung', which we have somewhat arbitrarily translated as 'likening'.
Being and Time 1. 6 2 15 The neo-Kantian epistemology of the nineteenth century often characterized this definition of "truth" as an expression of a methodologically retarded naive realism, and declared it to be irreconcilable with any formulation of this question which has undergone Kant's 'Copernican revolution'. But Kant too adhered to this conception of truth, so much so that he did not even bring it up for discussion; this has been overlooked, though Brentano has already called our attenti<.n to it. 'The old and celebrated question with which it was supposed that one might drive the logicians into a corner is this: "what is truth?" The explanation of the name of truth-namely, that it is the agreement of knowledge with its object-will here be granted and presupposed .. ;xxxt. 'If truth consists in the agreement ofknowledge with its object, then this object must thus be distinguished from others; for knowledge is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related, even if it should contain something which might well be valid for other objects.'xxUx And in the introduction to the "Transcendental Dialectic" Kant states: 'Truth and illusion are not in the object so far as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it so far as it is thought. •xxxtu Of course this characterization of truth as 'agreement', adaequatio, OJLolwcns, is very general and empty. Yet it will still have some justification if it can hold its own without prejudice to any of the most various Interpretations which that distinctive predicate "knowledge" will support. We are now inquiring into the fo undations of this 'relation'. What else is tacit(» posited in this relational totaliry of the adaequatio intellectus et rei? And what ontological character does that which is thus posited have itself? What in general does one have in view when one uses the term 'agreement' ? The agreement of something with something has the formal character of.a relation of something to something. Every agreement, and therefore 'truth' as well, is a relation. But not every relation is an agreement. A sign points at what is indicated.1 Such indicating is a relation, but not an agreement of the sign with what is indicated. Yet manifestly not every agreement is a convenientia of the kind that is fixed upon in the definition of"truth". The number "6" agrees with "16 minus 10". These 216 numbers agree; they are equal with regard to the question of "how much?" Equality is one way of agreeing. Its structure is such that something like a 'with-regard-to' belongs to it. In the adaequatio something gets related; what is that with regard to which it agrees? In clarifying the 'truth-relation' we must notice also what is peculiar to the terms of this relation. With regard to what do intellectus and res agree? In their kind of Being and their essential content do they give us anything at all with 1 'Ein Zeichen zeigt auf das Gezeigte.'
I. 6 Being and Time 259 regard to which they can agree? If it is impossible for intellectus and res to be equal because they are not of the same species, are they then perhaps similar? But knowledge is still supposed to 'give' the thing just as it is. This 'agreement' has the Relational character of the �ust as' ["SoWie"]. In what way is this relation possible as a relation between intellectus and res? From these questions it becomes plain that to clarify the structure of truth it is not enough simply to presuppose this relational totality, but we must go back and inquire into the context of Being which provides the support for this totality as such. Must we, however, bring up here the 'epistemological' problematic as regards the subject-Object relation, or can our analysis restrict itself to Interpreting the 'immanent consciousness of truth', and thus remain 'within the sphere' of the subject? According to the general opinion, what is true is knowledge. But knowledge is judging. In judgment one must distinguish between the judging as a Real psychical process, and that which is judged, as an ideal content. It will be said of the latter that it is 'true'. The Real psychical process, however, is either present-at-hand or not. According to this opinion, the ideal content of judgment stands in a relationship of agreement. This relationship thus pertains to a connection between an ideal content of judgment and the Real Thing as that which is judged about. Is this agreement Real or ideal in its kind of Being, or neither of these? How are we to take ontologie ally the relation between an ideal entiry and something that is Real and present-at-hand? Such a relation indeed subsists [besteht] ; and in factical judgments it subsists not only as a relation between the content of judgment and the Real Object, but likewise as a relation between the ideal content and the Real act of judgment. And does it manifestly subsist 'more inwardly' in this latter case? Or is the ontological meaning of the relation between Real and ideal (p.l8£g£!>) something about which we must not inquire? Yet the relation is to be one which subsists. What does such "subsisting" [Bestand] mean ontologically? Why should this not be a legitimate question? Is it accidental that no headway has been made with this problem in over two thousand years? Has 2 I 7 the question already been perverted in theverywayit has been approached -in the ontologically unclarified separation of the Real and the ideal? And with regard to the 'actual' judging of what is judged, is the separation of the Real act of judgment from the ideal content altogether unjustified? Does not the actuality of knowing and judging get broken asunder into two ways of Being-two 'levels' which can never be pieced together in such a manner as to reach the kind of Being that belongs to knowing? Is not psychologism correct in holding out against this separation, even
Being and Time 1. 6 if it neither clarifies ontologically the kind of Being which belongs to the thinking of that which is thought, nor is even so much as acquainted with it as a problem? If we go back to the distinction between the act of judgment and its content, we shall not advance our discussion of the question of the kind of Being which belongs to the adaequatio; we shall only 111ake plain the indispensability of clarifying the kind of Being which belongs to knowledge itself. In the analysis which this necessitates we must at the same time try to bring into view a phenomenon which is characteristic of knowledgethe phenomenon of truth. When does truth become phenomenally explicit in knowledge itself? It does so when such knowing demonstrates itself as true. By demonstrating itself it is assured of its truth. Thus in the phenomenal context of demonstration, the relationship of agreement must become visible. Let us suppose that someone with his back turned to the wall makes the true assertion that 'the picture on the wall is hanging askew.' This assertion demonstrates itself when the man who makes it, turns round and perceives the picture hanging askew on the wall. What gets demonstrated in this demonstration? What is the meaning of "confirming" [Bewahrung] such an assertion? Do we, let us say, ascertain some agreement between our 'knowledge' or 'what is known' and the Thing on the wall? Yes and no, depending upon whether our Interpretation of the expression 'what is known' is phenomenally appropriate. If he who makes the assertion judges without perceiving the picture, but 'merely represents' it to himself, to what is he related? To 'representations', shall we say? Certainly not, if "representation" is here supposed to signify representing, as a psychical process. Nor is he related to "representations" in the sense of what is thus "represented," if what we have in mind here is a 'picture' of that Real Thing which is on the wall.1 The asserting which 'merely represents' is related rather, in that sense which is most its own, to the Real picture on the wall. What one has in mind is the Real picture, and nothing else. Any Interpretation in which something else is here slipped in as what one supposedly has in mind in an assertion that merely 2 18 represents, belies the phenomenal facts of the case as to that about which the assertion gets made. Asserting is a way of Being towards the Thing itself that is. 2 And what does one's perceiving of it demonstrate? Nothing 1 'Er ist auch nicht aufVorstellungen bezogen im Sinne des Vorgestellten, sofem damit gemeint wird ein "Bild" von dem realen Ding an der Wand.' While we follow tradition in translating 'Vorstellung' as 'representation', the literal meaning is somewhat closer to 'putting before us'. In this sense our 'picture' or 'image' ('Bild') of the actual picture ('Bild') on the wall, is itself something which we have 'put before us' and which is thus 'vorgestellt', though in English we would hardly call it 'that which we represent'. 2 'Das Aussagen ist ein Sein zum seienden Ding selbst.'
I. 6 Being and Time else than that this Thing is the very entity which one has in mind in one's assertion. What comes up for confirmation is that this entity is pointed out by the Being in which the assertion is made-which is Being towards what is put forward in the assertion; thus what is to be confirmed is that such Being uncovers the entity towards which it is. What gets demonstrated is the Being-uncovering of the assertion.1 In carrying out such a demonstration, the knowing remains related solely to the entity itself. In this entity the confirmation, as it were, gets enacted. The entity itself which one has in mind shows itself just as it is in itself; that is to say, it shows that it, in its selfsameness, is just as it gets pointed out in the assertion as being-just as it gets uncovered as being. Representations do not get compared, either among themselves or in relation to the Real Thing. What is to be demonstrated is not an agreement of knowing with its object, still less of the psychical with the physical; but neither is it an agreement between 'contents of consciousness' among themselves. What is to be demonstrated is solely the Being-uncovered [Entdeckt-sein] of the entity itself-that entiry in the "how" of its uncoveredness. This uncoveredness is confirmed when that which is put forward in the assertion (namely the entity itself) shows itself as that very same thing. "Confirmation" signifies the entiry's showing itself in its selfsameness.xxxiv The confirmation is accomplished on the basis of the entity's showing itself. This is possible only in such a way that the knowing which asserts and which gets confirmed is, in its ontological meaning, itself a Being towards Real entities, and a Being that uncovers. To say that an assertion "is true" signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, 'lets' the entity 'be seen' (&:rr6<foavcns) in its uncoveredness. The Being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as Being-uncovering*. Thus truth has by no means the structure of an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense 2 I g of a likening of one entity (the subject) to another (the Object). Being-true as Being-uncovering*, is in turn ontologically possible only on the basis of Being-in-the-world. This latter phenomenon, which we have known as a basic state ofDasein, is thefoundation fo r the primordial phenomenon of truth. We shall now follow this up more penetratingly. 1 'Ausgewiesen wird das Entdeckend-sein der Aussage.' Here and in the following pages we find the expression 'Entdeckend-sein' consistently printed with a hyphen in the -more recent editions. In the older editions it is written sometimes as one word, sometimes as two, and it is hyphenated only at the ends of lines. In both editions we sometimes find this word printed with a lower-case initial. We have marked such cases with an asterisk; for while we prefer the translation 'Being-uncovering' in such cases, the lower-case initia suggests that 'to-be-uncovering' may be a better reading.
262 Being and Time I. 6 (b) The Primordial Phenomenon of Truth and the Derivative Character of the Traditional Conception of Truth "Being-true" ("truth") means Being-uncovering*. But is not this a highly arbitrary way to define "truth"? By such drastic ways of defining this concept we may succeed in eliminating the idea of agreement from the conception of truth. Must we not pay for this dubious gain by plunging the 'good' old tradition into nullity? But while our definition is seemingly arbitrary, it contains only the necessary Interpretation of what was primordially surmised in the oldest tradition of ancient philosophy and even understood in a pre-phenomenological manner. If a .\6yos as a1r6cpava's is to be true, its Being-true is &..\7]8W£w in the manner of &.7rocpalvEa8a, -of taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness). The &..\�8Ha which Aristotle equates with 7TpiiyJLa and cpaw6JL£Va in the passages cited above, signifies the 'things themselves'; it signifies what shows itself-entities in the "how" of their uncovererlness. And is it accidental that in one of the fragments of HeracleitusXXXV-the oldest fragments of philosophical doctrine in which the .\6yos is explicitly handled-the phenomenon of truth in the sense of uncovered ness ( unhiddenness), as we have set it forth, shows through? Those who are lacking in understanding are contrasted with the .\6yos, and also with him who speaks that .\6yos, and understands it. The .\6yos is cppa,wv �1rws lx££ : it tells how entities comport themselves. But to those who are lacking in understanding, what they do remains hidden -.\av8av££. They forget it (em.\av8avoVTa£); that is, for them it sinks back into hiddenness. Thus to the .\6yos belongs unhiddennessd.-.\�8Ha. To translate this word_ as 'truth', and, above all, to define this expression conceptually in theoretical ways, is to cover up the meaning of what the Greeks made 'self-evidently' basic for the terminological use of &..\�8Ha as a pre-philosophical way of understanding it. 220 In citing such evidence we must avoid uninhibited word-mysticism. Nevertheless, the ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental worrls in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from levelling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems. We have now given a phenomenal demonstration of what we set forth earlierxxxvl as to .\6yos and &..\�8Ha in, so to speak, a dogmatic Interpretation. In proposing our 'definition' of "truth" we have not shaken off the tradition, but we have appropriated it primordially; and we shall have done so all the more if we succeed in demonstrating that the idea of agreement is one to which theory had to come on the basis of the primordial phenomenon of truth, and if we can show how this came about.
1. 6 Being and Time Moreover, the 'definition' of "truth" as "uncoveredness" and as "Being-uncovering", it not a mere explanation of a word. Among those ways in which Dasein comports itself there are some which we are accustomed in the first instance to call 'true'; from the analysis of these our definition emerges. Being-true as Being-uncovering*, is a way of Being for Dasein. What makes this very uncovering possible must necessarily be called 'true' in a still more primordial sense. The most primordial phenomenon of truth is first shown by the existential-ontological fo undations of uncovering. Uncovering is a way of Being for Being-in-the-world. Circumspective concern, or even that concern in which we tarry and look at something, uncovers entities within-the-world. These entities become that which has been uncovered. They are 'true' in a second sense. What is primarily 'true'-that is, uncovering-is Dasein. "Truth" in the second sense does not mean Being-uncovering* (uncovering), but Being-uncovered (uncoveredness). Our earlier analysis of the worldhood of the world and of entities withinthe-world has shown, however, that the uncoveredness of entities withinthe-world is grounrled in the world's disclosedness. But disclosedness is that basic character ofDasein according to which it is its "there". Disclosedness is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse, and pertains equiprimordially to the world, to Being-in, and to the Self. In its very structure, care is . ahead of itself-Being already in a world-as Being alongside entities within-the-world; and in this structure the disclosedness of Dasein lies hidden. With and through it is uncoveredness;1 hence only with Dasein's disclosedness is the most primordial phenomenon of truth 221 attained. What we have pointed out earlier with regard to the existential Constitution of the "there"xxixvi and in relation to the everyday Being of the "there" ,xxxvm pertains to the most primordial phenomenon of truth, nothing less. In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as something disclosed to this extent it is essentially 'true'. Dasein is 'in the truth'. This assertion has meaning ontologically. It does not purport to say that ontically Dasein is introduced 'to all the truth' either always or just in every case, but rather that the disclosedness of its ownmost Being belongs to its existential constitution. If we accept the results we have obtained earlier, the full existential meaning of the principle that 'Dasein is in the truth' can be restored by the following considerations: 1 'Mit und durch sie ist Entdecktheit .. .' Our version reflects the ambiguity of the German, which leaves the grammatical function of the pronoun 'sie' obscure and permits it to refer either to 'the disclosedness of Dasein', to 'care', or-perhaps most likely-to 'the structure of care'.
Being and Time 1. 6 ( 1) To Dasein's state of Being, disclosedness in general essentially belongs. It embraces the whole of that structure-of-Being which has become explicit through the phenomenon of care. To care belongs not only Beingin-the-world but also Being alongside entities within-the-world. The uncoveredness of such entities is equiprimordial with the Being of Dasein and its disclosedness. (2) To Dasein's state ofBeing belongs thrownness; indeed it is constitutive fo r Dasein's disclosedness. In thrownness is revealed that in each case Dasein, as my Dasein and this Dasein, is already in a definite world and alongside a definite range of definite entities within-the-world.1 Disclosedness is essentially factical. (3) To Dasein's state of Being belongs projection-disclosive Being towards its potentiality-for-Being. As something that understands, Dasein can understand itself in terms of the 'world' and Others or in terms of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. 2 The possibility just mentioned means that Dasein discloses itself to itself in and as its ownmost potentiality-for Being. This authentic disclosedness shows the phenomenon of the most primordial truth in the mode of authenticity. The most primordial, and indeed the most authentic, disclosedness in which Dasein, as a potentiality-for-Being, can be, is the truth of existence. This becomes existentially and ontologically definite only in connection with the analysis ofDasein's authenticity. ' (4) To Dasein's state of Being belongs fa lling. Proximally and for the 222 most part Dasein is lost in its 'world'. Its understanding, as a projection upon possibilities of Being, has diverted itself thither. Its absorption in the "they" signifies that it is dominated by the way things are publicly interpreted. That which has been uncovered and disclosed stands in a mode in which it has been disguised and closed off by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Being towards entities has not been extinguished, but it has been uprooted. Entities have not been completely hidden; they are precisely the sort of thing that has been uncovered, but at the same time they have been disguised. They show themselves, but in the mode of semblance. Likewise what has formerly been uncovered sinks back again, hidden and disguised. Because Dasein is essentially fa lling, its state of Being is such that it is in 'untruth'. This term, like the expression 'falling', is here used ontologically. If we are to use it in existential analysis, we must 1 'In ihr enthiillt sich, dass Dasein je schon a1s meines und dieses in einer bestimmten Welt und bei einem bestimmten Umkreis von bestimmten innerweltlichen Seienden ist.' 2 ' ••• der Entwurf: das erschliessende Sein zu seinem Seinkonnen. Dasein kann sich als verstehendes aus der "Welt" und den Anderen her verstehen oder aus seinem eigensten Seinkonnen.' The earlier editions have a full stop after 'Entwurf' rather than a colon, and introduce 'das' with a capital. The grammatical function of 'als versteheodes' seems ambiguous.
I. 6 Being and Time avoid giving it any ontically negative 'evaluation'. To be closed off and covered up belongs to Dasein's facticity. In its full existential-ontological meaning, the proposition that 'Dasein is in the truth' states equiprimordially that 'Dasein is in untruth'. But only in so far as Dasein'has been disclosed has it also been closed off; and only in so fa r as entities withinthe-world have been uncovered along with Dasein, have such entities, as possibly encounterable within-the-world, been covered up (hidden) or disguised. It is therefore essential that Dasein should explicitly appropriate what has already been uncovered, defend it against semblance and disguise, and assure itself of its uncoveredness again and again. The uncovering of anything new is never done on the basis of having something completely hidden, but takes its departure rather from untoveredness in the mode of semblance. Entities look as if •.. That is, they have, in a certain way, been uncovered already, and yet they are still disguised. Truth (uncoveredness) is something that must always first be wrested from entities. Entities get snatched out of their hiddenness. The factical uncoveredness of anything is always, as it were, a kind of robbery. Is it accidental that when the Greeks express themselves as to the essence of truth, they use a privative expression-d-..\�8em? When Dasein so expresses itself, does not a primordial understanding of its own Being thus make itself known-the understanding (even if it is only pre-ontological) that Being-in-untruth makes up an essential characteristic of Being-in-the world? The goddess of Truth who guides Parmenides, puts two pathways before him, one of uncovering, one of hiding; but this signifies nothing else than that Dasein is already both in the truth and in untruth. The way of uncovering is achieved only in Kplvew ..\oycp-in distinguishing between 223 these understandingly, and making one's decision for the one rather than the other.XXXix The existential-ontological condition for the fact that Being-in-theworld is characterized by 'truth' and 'untruth', lies in that state ofDasein's Being which we have designated as thrown projection. This is something that is constitutive fo r the structure of care. The upshot of our existential-ontological Interpretation of the phenomenon of truth is (I) that truth, in the most primordial sense, is Dasein's disclosedness, to which the uncoveredness of entities within-the-world belongs; and (2) that Dasein is equiprimordially both in the truth and in untruth. Within the horizon of the traditional Interpretation of the phenomenon of truth, our insight into these principles will not be complete until it can
Being and Titn� I. 6 be shown: (I) that truth, understood as agreement, originates from dis� closedness by way of definite modification; (2) that the kind of Being which belongs to disclosedness itself is such that its derivative modification first comes into view and leads the way for the theoretical explication of the structure of truth. Assertion and its structure (namely, the apophantical "as") are fo unded upon interpretation and its structure (viz, the hermeneutical "as") and also upon understanding-upon Dasein's disclosedness. Truth, however, is regarded as a distinctive character of assertion as so derived. Thus the roots of the truth of assertion reach back to the disclosedness of the under� standing.xl But over and above these indications of how the truth of assertion has originated, the phenomenon of agreement must not be exhibited explicit[y in its derivative character. Our Being alongside entities within-the-world is concern, and this is Being which uncovers. To Dasein's disclosedness, however, discourse belongs essentially.xll Dasein expresses itself [spricht sich a us] : it expresses 224 itself as a Being-towards entities-a Being-towards which uncovers. And in assertion it expresses itself as such about entities which have been uncovered. Assertion communicates entities in the "how" of their un� coveredness. When Dasein is aware of the communication, it brings itself in its awareness into an uncovering Being-towards the entities discussed. The assertion which is expressed is about something, and in what it is about [in ihrem Woriiber] it contains the uncoveredness of these entities. This uncoveredness is preserved in what is expressed. What is expressed becomes, as it were, something ready-to-hand within-the-world which can be taken up and spoken again.1 Because the uncoveredness has been preserved, that which is expressed (which thus is ready-to-hand) has in itself a relation to any entities about which it is, an assertion. Any uncoveredness is an uncoveredness of something. Even when Dasein speaks over again what someone else has said, it comes into a Being-towards the very entities which have been discussed. 3 But it has been exempted from having to uncover them again, primordially, and it holds that it has been thus exempted. Dasein need not bring itself face to face with entities themselves in an 'original' experience; but it nevertheless remains in a Being-towards these entities. In a large measure uncoveredness gets appropriated not by one's own uncovering, but rather by hearsay of something that has been said. 1 'Das Ausgesprochene wird gleichsam zu einem innerweldich Zuhandenen, das aufgenommen und weitergesprochen werden kann.' While we have·followed our usual policy in translating 'das Ausgesprochene' as 'what is expressed', it might perhaps be translated as 'that which is spoken out', 'the utterance', or even 'the pronouncement'. 2 "Auch im Nachsprechen kommt das nachsprechende Dasein in ein Sein zum besprochenen Seienden selbst.'
I. 6 Being and Time 267 Absorption in something that has been said belongs to the kind of Being which the "they" possesses. That which has been expressed as such takes over Being-towards those entities which have been uncovered in the assertion. If, however, these entities are to be appropriated explicitly with regard to their uncoveredness, this amounts to saying that the assertion is to be demonstrated as one that uncovers. But the assertion expressed is something ready-to-hand, and indeed in such a way that, as something by which uncoveredness is preserved, it has in itself a relation to the entities uncovered. Now to demonstrate that it is something which uncovers [ihres Entdeckend-seins] means to demonstrate how the assertion by which the uncoveredness is preserved is related to these entities. The assertion is something ready-to-hand. The entities to which it is related as something that uncovers, are either ready-to-hand or presentat-hand within-the-world. The relation itself presents itself thus, as one that is present-at-hand. But this relation lies in the fact that the uncoveredness preserved in the assertion is in each case an uncoveredness o f something. The judgment 'contains something which holds for the objects' (Kant). But the relation itself now acquires the character of presence-athand by getting switched over to a relationship between things which are present-at-hand. The uncoveredness of something becomes the presentat-hand conformity of one thing which is present-at-hand-the assertion expressed-to something else which is present-at-hand-the entity under discussion. And if this conformity is seen only as a relationship between things which are present-at-hand-that is, if the kind of Being which belongs to the terms of this relationship has not been discriminated and is understood as something merely present-at-hand-then the relation shows itself as an agreement of two things which are present-at-hand, an agree· ment which is present-at-hand itsel£ When the assertion has been expressed, the uncoveredness of the entity moves into 225 the kind of Being of that which is ready-to-hand within-the-world.1 But now to the extent that in this uncoveredness, as an uncoveredness o f something, a relationship to something present-at-hand persists, the uncoveredness (truth) becomes, for its part, a relationship between things which are present-at-hand intellectus and res)-a relationship that is present-at-hand itself. Though it is founded upon Dasein's disclosedness, the existential phenomenon of uncoveredness becomes a property which is present-athand but in which there still lurks a relational character; and as such a property, it gets broken asunder into a relationship which is present-athand. Truth as disclosedness and as a Being-towards uncovered entities-a 1 'Die Entdecktheit des Seienden riickt mit der Ausgesproclunheit der Aussage in die Seinsart des innerweltlich ,uhandenen.'
Being and TiTTII 1. 6 Being which itself uncovers-has become truth as agreement between things which are present-at-hand within-the-world. And thus we have pointed out the ontologically derivative character of the traditional conception of truth. Yet that which is last in the order of the way things are connected in their foundations existentially and ontologically, is regarded ontically and factically as that which is first and closest to us. The necessity of this Fact, however, is based in turn upon the kind of Being which Dasein itself possesses. Dasein, in its concernful absorption, understands itself in terms of what it encounters within-the-world. The uncoveredness which belongs to uncovering, is something that we come across proximally within-theworld in that which has been expressed [im Ausgesprochenen]. Not only truth, however, is encountered as present-at-hand: in general our understanding of Being is such that every entity is understood in the first instance as present-at-hand. If the 'truth' which we encounter proximally in an ontical manner is considered ontologically in the way that is closest to us, then the .\6yos (the assertion) gets understood as .\oyos Twosas an assertion about something, an uncoveredness of something; but the phenomenon gets Interpreted as something present-at-hand with regard to its possible presence-at-hand.1 Yet because presence-at-hand has been equated with the meaning of Being in general, the question of whether this kind of Being of truth is a primordial one, and whether there is anything primordial in that structure of it which we encounter as closest to us, can not come alive at all. The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by Dasein' s very understanding of Being-that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle. At the same time, however, we must not overlook the fact that while this way of understanding Being (the way which is closest to us) is one which the Greeks were the first to develop as a branch of knowledge and to master, the primordial understanding of truth was simultaneously alive among them, even if pre-ontologically, and it even held its own against the concealment implicit in their ontology-at least in Aristotle.xlll 226 Aristotle never defends the thesis that the primordial 'locus' of truth is in the judgment. He says rather that the .\oyos is that way of Being in which Dasein can either uncover or cover up. This double possibility is what is distinctive in the Being-true of the .\6yos: the .\&yos is that way of comporting oneself which can also cover things up. And because Aristotle never upheld the thesis we have mentioned, he was also never in a 1 ' ••• interpretiert aber das Phanomen als Vorhandenes auf seine miigliche Vorhandenheit.'
I. 6 Being and Time situation to 'broaden' the conception of truth in the .\&yos- to include pure voEi:v. The truth of ata87Jats- and of the seeing of 'ideas' is the primordial kind of uncovering. And only because V07JG'S' primarily uncovers, can the .:\&yos- as 8£avo£i:v also have uncovering as its function. Not only is it wrong to invoke Aristotle for the thesis that the genuine 'locus' of truth lies in the judgment; even in its content this thesis fails to recognize the structure of truth. Assertion is not the primary 'locus' of truth. On the contrary, whether as a mode in which uncoveredness is appropriated or as a way of Being-in-the-world, assertion is grounded in Dasein's uncovering, or rather in its disclosedness. The most primordial 'truth' is the 'locus' of assertion; it is the ontological condition for the possibility that assertions can be either true or false--that they may uncover or cover things up. Truth, understood in the most primordial sense, belongs to the basic constitution of Dasein. The term signifies an existentiale. But herewith we have already sketched out our answers to the question of what kind of Being truth possesses, and to the question of in what sense it is necessary to presuppose that 'there is truth'.
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Old 02-18-2018, 09:44 PM
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Originally Posted by bluewpc View Post
Youll have to forgive me for this I thought an extended passage from Heidegger would be relevant Ill post my own thoughts later (Im busy on me novel ). WB doesnt seem to support Greek characters (thats all that gobbledigook) so here is the link http://pdf-objects.com/files/Heidegg...kwell-1962.pdf pages 257 to 270

44· Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth From time immemorial, philosophy has associated truth and Being. Parmenides was the first to discover the Being of entities, and he 'identified' Being with the perceptive understandmg of Being: T6 y4p aV76 vo�;iv �crrlv T�< Ka��;tva,.= Aristotle, in ou�ning the history of how the &.pxal have 213 been uncovered,=temphasizes that the philosophers before him, under the guidance of 'the things themselves' have been compelled to inquire further: aV76 T6 1rpB.yJLa JJooTTol"lut"V aV7oiS' Ka� uvv71v&yKau�; '"lT�<iv.xxU He is describing the same fact when he says that&.vayKa,OJL�<VOS'O'dKo..\ov8�;iv Tois cfoawoJLlvo,sJtXUt__that he (Parmenides) was compelled to follow that which showed itself in itself: In another passage he remarks that these thinkers carried on their researches {m' aVTfjS' TfjS' &...\"18�<las &.vayKa'OJL�<Vo,xxiv-"compelled by the 'truth' itself". Aristotle describes these researches as .p,..\ouocfo�;iv TT�<p� TfjS' &...\"18�;las=v-" 'philosophizing' about the 'truth' "--or even as &.7rocfoalv�;u8a, TT�<p� TfjS' &...\"18�;las=vt_a_s exhibiting something and letting it be seen with regard to the 'truth' and within the range of the 'truth'. Philosophy itself is defined as �mcrr'J]JL"l TfjS' d..\"18�<las=vtt__"the science of the 'truth' ". But it is also characterized as �mcrr�JL"l, � 8�;wpt;i T6 �v D �vJtXVUL_ as "a science which contemplates entities as entities"-that is, with regard to their Being. What is signified here by 'carrying on researches into the "truth" ', by "science of the 'truth' " ? In such researches is 'truth' made a theme as it would be in a theory of knowledge or of judgment? Manifestly not, fo r 'truth' signifies the same as 'thing' ["Sache"], 'something that shows itself'. But what then does the expression 'truth' signify if it can be used as a term fo r 'entity' and 'Being'? If, however, truth rightfully has a primordial connection with Being, then the phenomenon of truth comes within the range of the problematic of fundamental ontology. In that case, must not this phenomenon have been encountered already within our preparatory fundamental analysis, the analytic of Dasein? What ontico-ontological connection does 'truth' have with Dasein and with that ontical characteristic of Dasein which we call the "understanding ofBeing"? Can the reason why Being necessarily goes together with truth and vice versa be pointed out in terms of such understanding? These questions are not to be evaded. Because Being does indeed 'go together' with truth, the phenomenon of truth has already been one of the themes of our earlier analyses, though not explicitly under this title. In
I. 6 Being and Time giving precision to the problem of Being, it is now time to delimit the phenomenon of truth explicitly and to fix the problems which it comprises. In doing this, we should not just take together what we have previously 214 taken apart. Our investigation requires a new approach. Our analysis takes its departure from the traditional conception of truth, and attempts to lay bare the ontological foundations of that conception (a). In terms of these foundations the primordial phenomenon of truth becomes visible. We can then exhibit the way in which the traditional conception of truth has been derived from this phenomenon (b). Qur investigation will make it plain that to the question of the 'essence' 'of truth, there belongs necessarily the question of the kind of Being which truth possesses. Together with this we must clarify the ontological meaning of the kind of talk in which we say that 'there is truth', and we must also clarify the kind of necessity with which 'we must presuppose' that 'there is' truth (c). (a) The Traditional Conception of Truth, and its Ontological Foundations There are three theses which characterize the way in which the essence of truth has been traditionally taken and the way it is supposed to have been first defined: (1) that the 'locus' of truth is assertion (judgment) ; (2) that the essence of truth lies in the 'agreement' of th� judgment with its object; (3) that Aristotle, the father of logic, not only has assigned truth to the judgment as its primordial locus but has set going the definition of "truth" as 'agreement' .1 Here it is not our aim to provide a history of the concept of truth, which could be presented only on the basis of a history of ontology. We shall introduce our analytical discussions by alluding to some fa miliar matters. Aristotle says that the 7TaO�p,ara Tfj!; ifivxfj!; are TWV 7Tpayp,arwv op,oulJp.araXXix_that the soul's 'Experiences', its vo�p,ara ('representations'), are likenings of Things. This assertion, which is by no means proposed as an explicit definition of the essence of truth, has also given occasion for developing the later formulation of the essence of truth 'as adaequatio intellectus et rei. 2 Thomas Aquinas,xxx who refers this definition to Avicenna (who, in turn, has taken it over from Isaac Israeli's tenth-century 'Book of Definitions') also uses fo r "adaequatio" (likening) the terms "correspondentia" ("correspondence") and "convenientia" (" coming together"). 1 Here we follow the older editions in reading ' ... hat sowohl die Wahrheit dem Urteil als ihrem urspriinglichen Ort zugewiesen als auch die Definition der Wahrheit als "Ubereinstimmung" in Gang gebracht.' The newer editions read ' ..• hat sowohl •.. zugewiesen, er hat auch .. .' 2 This is usually translated as 'adequation of the intellect and the thing'. Heidegger makes the connection seem closer by translating both the Latin adaequatio and the Greek OJLolwp.a by the word 'Angleichung', which we have somewhat arbitrarily translated as 'likening'.
Being and Time 1. 6 2 15 The neo-Kantian epistemology of the nineteenth century often characterized this definition of "truth" as an expression of a methodologically retarded naive realism, and declared it to be irreconcilable with any formulation of this question which has undergone Kant's 'Copernican revolution'. But Kant too adhered to this conception of truth, so much so that he did not even bring it up for discussion; this has been overlooked, though Brentano has already called our attenti<.n to it. 'The old and celebrated question with which it was supposed that one might drive the logicians into a corner is this: "what is truth?" The explanation of the name of truth-namely, that it is the agreement of knowledge with its object-will here be granted and presupposed .. ;xxxt. 'If truth consists in the agreement ofknowledge with its object, then this object must thus be distinguished from others; for knowledge is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related, even if it should contain something which might well be valid for other objects.'xxUx And in the introduction to the "Transcendental Dialectic" Kant states: 'Truth and illusion are not in the object so far as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it so far as it is thought. •xxxtu Of course this characterization of truth as 'agreement', adaequatio, OJLolwcns, is very general and empty. Yet it will still have some justification if it can hold its own without prejudice to any of the most various Interpretations which that distinctive predicate "knowledge" will support. We are now inquiring into the fo undations of this 'relation'. What else is tacit(» posited in this relational totaliry of the adaequatio intellectus et rei? And what ontological character does that which is thus posited have itself? What in general does one have in view when one uses the term 'agreement' ? The agreement of something with something has the formal character of.a relation of something to something. Every agreement, and therefore 'truth' as well, is a relation. But not every relation is an agreement. A sign points at what is indicated.1 Such indicating is a relation, but not an agreement of the sign with what is indicated. Yet manifestly not every agreement is a convenientia of the kind that is fixed upon in the definition of"truth". The number "6" agrees with "16 minus 10". These 216 numbers agree; they are equal with regard to the question of "how much?" Equality is one way of agreeing. Its structure is such that something like a 'with-regard-to' belongs to it. In the adaequatio something gets related; what is that with regard to which it agrees? In clarifying the 'truth-relation' we must notice also what is peculiar to the terms of this relation. With regard to what do intellectus and res agree? In their kind of Being and their essential content do they give us anything at all with 1 'Ein Zeichen zeigt auf das Gezeigte.'
I. 6 Being and Time 259 regard to which they can agree? If it is impossible for intellectus and res to be equal because they are not of the same species, are they then perhaps similar? But knowledge is still supposed to 'give' the thing just as it is. This 'agreement' has the Relational character of the �ust as' ["SoWie"]. In what way is this relation possible as a relation between intellectus and res? From these questions it becomes plain that to clarify the structure of truth it is not enough simply to presuppose this relational totality, but we must go back and inquire into the context of Being which provides the support for this totality as such. Must we, however, bring up here the 'epistemological' problematic as regards the subject-Object relation, or can our analysis restrict itself to Interpreting the 'immanent consciousness of truth', and thus remain 'within the sphere' of the subject? According to the general opinion, what is true is knowledge. But knowledge is judging. In judgment one must distinguish between the judging as a Real psychical process, and that which is judged, as an ideal content. It will be said of the latter that it is 'true'. The Real psychical process, however, is either present-at-hand or not. According to this opinion, the ideal content of judgment stands in a relationship of agreement. This relationship thus pertains to a connection between an ideal content of judgment and the Real Thing as that which is judged about. Is this agreement Real or ideal in its kind of Being, or neither of these? How are we to take ontologie ally the relation between an ideal entiry and something that is Real and present-at-hand? Such a relation indeed subsists [besteht] ; and in factical judgments it subsists not only as a relation between the content of judgment and the Real Object, but likewise as a relation between the ideal content and the Real act of judgment. And does it manifestly subsist 'more inwardly' in this latter case? Or is the ontological meaning of the relation between Real and ideal (p.l8£g£!>) something about which we must not inquire? Yet the relation is to be one which subsists. What does such "subsisting" [Bestand] mean ontologically? Why should this not be a legitimate question? Is it accidental that no headway has been made with this problem in over two thousand years? Has 2 I 7 the question already been perverted in theverywayit has been approached -in the ontologically unclarified separation of the Real and the ideal? And with regard to the 'actual' judging of what is judged, is the separation of the Real act of judgment from the ideal content altogether unjustified? Does not the actuality of knowing and judging get broken asunder into two ways of Being-two 'levels' which can never be pieced together in such a manner as to reach the kind of Being that belongs to knowing? Is not psychologism correct in holding out against this separation, even
Being and Time 1. 6 if it neither clarifies ontologically the kind of Being which belongs to the thinking of that which is thought, nor is even so much as acquainted with it as a problem? If we go back to the distinction between the act of judgment and its content, we shall not advance our discussion of the question of the kind of Being which belongs to the adaequatio; we shall only 111ake plain the indispensability of clarifying the kind of Being which belongs to knowledge itself. In the analysis which this necessitates we must at the same time try to bring into view a phenomenon which is characteristic of knowledgethe phenomenon of truth. When does truth become phenomenally explicit in knowledge itself? It does so when such knowing demonstrates itself as true. By demonstrating itself it is assured of its truth. Thus in the phenomenal context of demonstration, the relationship of agreement must become visible. Let us suppose that someone with his back turned to the wall makes the true assertion that 'the picture on the wall is hanging askew.' This assertion demonstrates itself when the man who makes it, turns round and perceives the picture hanging askew on the wall. What gets demonstrated in this demonstration? What is the meaning of "confirming" [Bewahrung] such an assertion? Do we, let us say, ascertain some agreement between our 'knowledge' or 'what is known' and the Thing on the wall? Yes and no, depending upon whether our Interpretation of the expression 'what is known' is phenomenally appropriate. If he who makes the assertion judges without perceiving the picture, but 'merely represents' it to himself, to what is he related? To 'representations', shall we say? Certainly not, if "representation" is here supposed to signify representing, as a psychical process. Nor is he related to "representations" in the sense of what is thus "represented," if what we have in mind here is a 'picture' of that Real Thing which is on the wall.1 The asserting which 'merely represents' is related rather, in that sense which is most its own, to the Real picture on the wall. What one has in mind is the Real picture, and nothing else. Any Interpretation in which something else is here slipped in as what one supposedly has in mind in an assertion that merely 2 18 represents, belies the phenomenal facts of the case as to that about which the assertion gets made. Asserting is a way of Being towards the Thing itself that is. 2 And what does one's perceiving of it demonstrate? Nothing 1 'Er ist auch nicht aufVorstellungen bezogen im Sinne des Vorgestellten, sofem damit gemeint wird ein "Bild" von dem realen Ding an der Wand.' While we follow tradition in translating 'Vorstellung' as 'representation', the literal meaning is somewhat closer to 'putting before us'. In this sense our 'picture' or 'image' ('Bild') of the actual picture ('Bild') on the wall, is itself something which we have 'put before us' and which is thus 'vorgestellt', though in English we would hardly call it 'that which we represent'. 2 'Das Aussagen ist ein Sein zum seienden Ding selbst.'
I. 6 Being and Time else than that this Thing is the very entity which one has in mind in one's assertion. What comes up for confirmation is that this entity is pointed out by the Being in which the assertion is made-which is Being towards what is put forward in the assertion; thus what is to be confirmed is that such Being uncovers the entity towards which it is. What gets demonstrated is the Being-uncovering of the assertion.1 In carrying out such a demonstration, the knowing remains related solely to the entity itself. In this entity the confirmation, as it were, gets enacted. The entity itself which one has in mind shows itself just as it is in itself; that is to say, it shows that it, in its selfsameness, is just as it gets pointed out in the assertion as being-just as it gets uncovered as being. Representations do not get compared, either among themselves or in relation to the Real Thing. What is to be demonstrated is not an agreement of knowing with its object, still less of the psychical with the physical; but neither is it an agreement between 'contents of consciousness' among themselves. What is to be demonstrated is solely the Being-uncovered [Entdeckt-sein] of the entity itself-that entiry in the "how" of its uncoveredness. This uncoveredness is confirmed when that which is put forward in the assertion (namely the entity itself) shows itself as that very same thing. "Confirmation" signifies the entiry's showing itself in its selfsameness.xxxiv The confirmation is accomplished on the basis of the entity's showing itself. This is possible only in such a way that the knowing which asserts and which gets confirmed is, in its ontological meaning, itself a Being towards Real entities, and a Being that uncovers. To say that an assertion "is true" signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, 'lets' the entity 'be seen' (&:rr6<foavcns) in its uncoveredness. The Being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as Being-uncovering*. Thus truth has by no means the structure of an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense 2 I g of a likening of one entity (the subject) to another (the Object). Being-true as Being-uncovering*, is in turn ontologically possible only on the basis of Being-in-the-world. This latter phenomenon, which we have known as a basic state ofDasein, is thefoundation fo r the primordial phenomenon of truth. We shall now follow this up more penetratingly. 1 'Ausgewiesen wird das Entdeckend-sein der Aussage.' Here and in the following pages we find the expression 'Entdeckend-sein' consistently printed with a hyphen in the -more recent editions. In the older editions it is written sometimes as one word, sometimes as two, and it is hyphenated only at the ends of lines. In both editions we sometimes find this word printed with a lower-case initial. We have marked such cases with an asterisk; for while we prefer the translation 'Being-uncovering' in such cases, the lower-case initia suggests that 'to-be-uncovering' may be a better reading.
262 Being and Time I. 6 (b) The Primordial Phenomenon of Truth and the Derivative Character of the Traditional Conception of Truth "Being-true" ("truth") means Being-uncovering*. But is not this a highly arbitrary way to define "truth"? By such drastic ways of defining this concept we may succeed in eliminating the idea of agreement from the conception of truth. Must we not pay for this dubious gain by plunging the 'good' old tradition into nullity? But while our definition is seemingly arbitrary, it contains only the necessary Interpretation of what was primordially surmised in the oldest tradition of ancient philosophy and even understood in a pre-phenomenological manner. If a .\6yos as a1r6cpava's is to be true, its Being-true is &..\7]8W£w in the manner of &.7rocpalvEa8a, -of taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness). The &..\�8Ha which Aristotle equates with 7TpiiyJLa and cpaw6JL£Va in the passages cited above, signifies the 'things themselves'; it signifies what shows itself-entities in the "how" of their uncovererlness. And is it accidental that in one of the fragments of HeracleitusXXXV-the oldest fragments of philosophical doctrine in which the .\6yos is explicitly handled-the phenomenon of truth in the sense of uncovered ness ( unhiddenness), as we have set it forth, shows through? Those who are lacking in understanding are contrasted with the .\6yos, and also with him who speaks that .\6yos, and understands it. The .\6yos is cppa,wv �1rws lx££ : it tells how entities comport themselves. But to those who are lacking in understanding, what they do remains hidden -.\av8av££. They forget it (em.\av8avoVTa£); that is, for them it sinks back into hiddenness. Thus to the .\6yos belongs unhiddennessd.-.\�8Ha. To translate this word_ as 'truth', and, above all, to define this expression conceptually in theoretical ways, is to cover up the meaning of what the Greeks made 'self-evidently' basic for the terminological use of &..\�8Ha as a pre-philosophical way of understanding it. 220 In citing such evidence we must avoid uninhibited word-mysticism. Nevertheless, the ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental worrls in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from levelling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems. We have now given a phenomenal demonstration of what we set forth earlierxxxvl as to .\6yos and &..\�8Ha in, so to speak, a dogmatic Interpretation. In proposing our 'definition' of "truth" we have not shaken off the tradition, but we have appropriated it primordially; and we shall have done so all the more if we succeed in demonstrating that the idea of agreement is one to which theory had to come on the basis of the primordial phenomenon of truth, and if we can show how this came about.
1. 6 Being and Time Moreover, the 'definition' of "truth" as "uncoveredness" and as "Being-uncovering", it not a mere explanation of a word. Among those ways in which Dasein comports itself there are some which we are accustomed in the first instance to call 'true'; from the analysis of these our definition emerges. Being-true as Being-uncovering*, is a way of Being for Dasein. What makes this very uncovering possible must necessarily be called 'true' in a still more primordial sense. The most primordial phenomenon of truth is first shown by the existential-ontological fo undations of uncovering. Uncovering is a way of Being for Being-in-the-world. Circumspective concern, or even that concern in which we tarry and look at something, uncovers entities within-the-world. These entities become that which has been uncovered. They are 'true' in a second sense. What is primarily 'true'-that is, uncovering-is Dasein. "Truth" in the second sense does not mean Being-uncovering* (uncovering), but Being-uncovered (uncoveredness). Our earlier analysis of the worldhood of the world and of entities withinthe-world has shown, however, that the uncoveredness of entities withinthe-world is grounrled in the world's disclosedness. But disclosedness is that basic character ofDasein according to which it is its "there". Disclosedness is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse, and pertains equiprimordially to the world, to Being-in, and to the Self. In its very structure, care is . ahead of itself-Being already in a world-as Being alongside entities within-the-world; and in this structure the disclosedness of Dasein lies hidden. With and through it is uncoveredness;1 hence only with Dasein's disclosedness is the most primordial phenomenon of truth 221 attained. What we have pointed out earlier with regard to the existential Constitution of the "there"xxixvi and in relation to the everyday Being of the "there" ,xxxvm pertains to the most primordial phenomenon of truth, nothing less. In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as something disclosed to this extent it is essentially 'true'. Dasein is 'in the truth'. This assertion has meaning ontologically. It does not purport to say that ontically Dasein is introduced 'to all the truth' either always or just in every case, but rather that the disclosedness of its ownmost Being belongs to its existential constitution. If we accept the results we have obtained earlier, the full existential meaning of the principle that 'Dasein is in the truth' can be restored by the following considerations: 1 'Mit und durch sie ist Entdecktheit .. .' Our version reflects the ambiguity of the German, which leaves the grammatical function of the pronoun 'sie' obscure and permits it to refer either to 'the disclosedness of Dasein', to 'care', or-perhaps most likely-to 'the structure of care'.
Being and Time 1. 6 ( 1) To Dasein's state of Being, disclosedness in general essentially belongs. It embraces the whole of that structure-of-Being which has become explicit through the phenomenon of care. To care belongs not only Beingin-the-world but also Being alongside entities within-the-world. The uncoveredness of such entities is equiprimordial with the Being of Dasein and its disclosedness. (2) To Dasein's state ofBeing belongs thrownness; indeed it is constitutive fo r Dasein's disclosedness. In thrownness is revealed that in each case Dasein, as my Dasein and this Dasein, is already in a definite world and alongside a definite range of definite entities within-the-world.1 Disclosedness is essentially factical. (3) To Dasein's state of Being belongs projection-disclosive Being towards its potentiality-for-Being. As something that understands, Dasein can understand itself in terms of the 'world' and Others or in terms of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. 2 The possibility just mentioned means that Dasein discloses itself to itself in and as its ownmost potentiality-for Being. This authentic disclosedness shows the phenomenon of the most primordial truth in the mode of authenticity. The most primordial, and indeed the most authentic, disclosedness in which Dasein, as a potentiality-for-Being, can be, is the truth of existence. This becomes existentially and ontologically definite only in connection with the analysis ofDasein's authenticity. ' (4) To Dasein's state of Being belongs fa lling. Proximally and for the 222 most part Dasein is lost in its 'world'. Its understanding, as a projection upon possibilities of Being, has diverted itself thither. Its absorption in the "they" signifies that it is dominated by the way things are publicly interpreted. That which has been uncovered and disclosed stands in a mode in which it has been disguised and closed off by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Being towards entities has not been extinguished, but it has been uprooted. Entities have not been completely hidden; they are precisely the sort of thing that has been uncovered, but at the same time they have been disguised. They show themselves, but in the mode of semblance. Likewise what has formerly been uncovered sinks back again, hidden and disguised. Because Dasein is essentially fa lling, its state of Being is such that it is in 'untruth'. This term, like the expression 'falling', is here used ontologically. If we are to use it in existential analysis, we must 1 'In ihr enthiillt sich, dass Dasein je schon a1s meines und dieses in einer bestimmten Welt und bei einem bestimmten Umkreis von bestimmten innerweltlichen Seienden ist.' 2 ' ••• der Entwurf: das erschliessende Sein zu seinem Seinkonnen. Dasein kann sich als verstehendes aus der "Welt" und den Anderen her verstehen oder aus seinem eigensten Seinkonnen.' The earlier editions have a full stop after 'Entwurf' rather than a colon, and introduce 'das' with a capital. The grammatical function of 'als versteheodes' seems ambiguous.
I. 6 Being and Time avoid giving it any ontically negative 'evaluation'. To be closed off and covered up belongs to Dasein's facticity. In its full existential-ontological meaning, the proposition that 'Dasein is in the truth' states equiprimordially that 'Dasein is in untruth'. But only in so far as Dasein'has been disclosed has it also been closed off; and only in so fa r as entities withinthe-world have been uncovered along with Dasein, have such entities, as possibly encounterable within-the-world, been covered up (hidden) or disguised. It is therefore essential that Dasein should explicitly appropriate what has already been uncovered, defend it against semblance and disguise, and assure itself of its uncoveredness again and again. The uncovering of anything new is never done on the basis of having something completely hidden, but takes its departure rather from untoveredness in the mode of semblance. Entities look as if •.. That is, they have, in a certain way, been uncovered already, and yet they are still disguised. Truth (uncoveredness) is something that must always first be wrested from entities. Entities get snatched out of their hiddenness. The factical uncoveredness of anything is always, as it were, a kind of robbery. Is it accidental that when the Greeks express themselves as to the essence of truth, they use a privative expression-d-..\�8em? When Dasein so expresses itself, does not a primordial understanding of its own Being thus make itself known-the understanding (even if it is only pre-ontological) that Being-in-untruth makes up an essential characteristic of Being-in-the world? The goddess of Truth who guides Parmenides, puts two pathways before him, one of uncovering, one of hiding; but this signifies nothing else than that Dasein is already both in the truth and in untruth. The way of uncovering is achieved only in Kplvew ..\oycp-in distinguishing between 223 these understandingly, and making one's decision for the one rather than the other.XXXix The existential-ontological condition for the fact that Being-in-theworld is characterized by 'truth' and 'untruth', lies in that state ofDasein's Being which we have designated as thrown projection. This is something that is constitutive fo r the structure of care. The upshot of our existential-ontological Interpretation of the phenomenon of truth is (I) that truth, in the most primordial sense, is Dasein's disclosedness, to which the uncoveredness of entities within-the-world belongs; and (2) that Dasein is equiprimordially both in the truth and in untruth. Within the horizon of the traditional Interpretation of the phenomenon of truth, our insight into these principles will not be complete until it can
Being and Titn� I. 6 be shown: (I) that truth, understood as agreement, originates from dis� closedness by way of definite modification; (2) that the kind of Being which belongs to disclosedness itself is such that its derivative modification first comes into view and leads the way for the theoretical explication of the structure of truth. Assertion and its structure (namely, the apophantical "as") are fo unded upon interpretation and its structure (viz, the hermeneutical "as") and also upon understanding-upon Dasein's disclosedness. Truth, however, is regarded as a distinctive character of assertion as so derived. Thus the roots of the truth of assertion reach back to the disclosedness of the under� standing.xl But over and above these indications of how the truth of assertion has originated, the phenomenon of agreement must not be exhibited explicit[y in its derivative character. Our Being alongside entities within-the-world is concern, and this is Being which uncovers. To Dasein's disclosedness, however, discourse belongs essentially.xll Dasein expresses itself [spricht sich a us] : it expresses 224 itself as a Being-towards entities-a Being-towards which uncovers. And in assertion it expresses itself as such about entities which have been uncovered. Assertion communicates entities in the "how" of their un� coveredness. When Dasein is aware of the communication, it brings itself in its awareness into an uncovering Being-towards the entities discussed. The assertion which is expressed is about something, and in what it is about [in ihrem Woriiber] it contains the uncoveredness of these entities. This uncoveredness is preserved in what is expressed. What is expressed becomes, as it were, something ready-to-hand within-the-world which can be taken up and spoken again.1 Because the uncoveredness has been preserved, that which is expressed (which thus is ready-to-hand) has in itself a relation to any entities about which it is, an assertion. Any uncoveredness is an uncoveredness of something. Even when Dasein speaks over again what someone else has said, it comes into a Being-towards the very entities which have been discussed. 3 But it has been exempted from having to uncover them again, primordially, and it holds that it has been thus exempted. Dasein need not bring itself face to face with entities themselves in an 'original' experience; but it nevertheless remains in a Being-towards these entities. In a large measure uncoveredness gets appropriated not by one's own uncovering, but rather by hearsay of something that has been said. 1 'Das Ausgesprochene wird gleichsam zu einem innerweldich Zuhandenen, das aufgenommen und weitergesprochen werden kann.' While we have·followed our usual policy in translating 'das Ausgesprochene' as 'what is expressed', it might perhaps be translated as 'that which is spoken out', 'the utterance', or even 'the pronouncement'. 2 "Auch im Nachsprechen kommt das nachsprechende Dasein in ein Sein zum besprochenen Seienden selbst.'
I. 6 Being and Time 267 Absorption in something that has been said belongs to the kind of Being which the "they" possesses. That which has been expressed as such takes over Being-towards those entities which have been uncovered in the assertion. If, however, these entities are to be appropriated explicitly with regard to their uncoveredness, this amounts to saying that the assertion is to be demonstrated as one that uncovers. But the assertion expressed is something ready-to-hand, and indeed in such a way that, as something by which uncoveredness is preserved, it has in itself a relation to the entities uncovered. Now to demonstrate that it is something which uncovers [ihres Entdeckend-seins] means to demonstrate how the assertion by which the uncoveredness is preserved is related to these entities. The assertion is something ready-to-hand. The entities to which it is related as something that uncovers, are either ready-to-hand or presentat-hand within-the-world. The relation itself presents itself thus, as one that is present-at-hand. But this relation lies in the fact that the uncoveredness preserved in the assertion is in each case an uncoveredness o f something. The judgment 'contains something which holds for the objects' (Kant). But the relation itself now acquires the character of presence-athand by getting switched over to a relationship between things which are present-at-hand. The uncoveredness of something becomes the presentat-hand conformity of one thing which is present-at-hand-the assertion expressed-to something else which is present-at-hand-the entity under discussion. And if this conformity is seen only as a relationship between things which are present-at-hand-that is, if the kind of Being which belongs to the terms of this relationship has not been discriminated and is understood as something merely present-at-hand-then the relation shows itself as an agreement of two things which are present-at-hand, an agree· ment which is present-at-hand itsel£ When the assertion has been expressed, the uncoveredness of the entity moves into 225 the kind of Being of that which is ready-to-hand within-the-world.1 But now to the extent that in this uncoveredness, as an uncoveredness o f something, a relationship to something present-at-hand persists, the uncoveredness (truth) becomes, for its part, a relationship between things which are present-at-hand intellectus and res)-a relationship that is present-at-hand itself. Though it is founded upon Dasein's disclosedness, the existential phenomenon of uncoveredness becomes a property which is present-athand but in which there still lurks a relational character; and as such a property, it gets broken asunder into a relationship which is present-athand. Truth as disclosedness and as a Being-towards uncovered entities-a 1 'Die Entdecktheit des Seienden riickt mit der Ausgesproclunheit der Aussage in die Seinsart des innerweltlich ,uhandenen.'
Being and TiTTII 1. 6 Being which itself uncovers-has become truth as agreement between things which are present-at-hand within-the-world. And thus we have pointed out the ontologically derivative character of the traditional conception of truth. Yet that which is last in the order of the way things are connected in their foundations existentially and ontologically, is regarded ontically and factically as that which is first and closest to us. The necessity of this Fact, however, is based in turn upon the kind of Being which Dasein itself possesses. Dasein, in its concernful absorption, understands itself in terms of what it encounters within-the-world. The uncoveredness which belongs to uncovering, is something that we come across proximally within-theworld in that which has been expressed [im Ausgesprochenen]. Not only truth, however, is encountered as present-at-hand: in general our understanding of Being is such that every entity is understood in the first instance as present-at-hand. If the 'truth' which we encounter proximally in an ontical manner is considered ontologically in the way that is closest to us, then the .\6yos (the assertion) gets understood as .\oyos Twosas an assertion about something, an uncoveredness of something; but the phenomenon gets Interpreted as something present-at-hand with regard to its possible presence-at-hand.1 Yet because presence-at-hand has been equated with the meaning of Being in general, the question of whether this kind of Being of truth is a primordial one, and whether there is anything primordial in that structure of it which we encounter as closest to us, can not come alive at all. The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by Dasein' s very understanding of Being-that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle. At the same time, however, we must not overlook the fact that while this way of understanding Being (the way which is closest to us) is one which the Greeks were the first to develop as a branch of knowledge and to master, the primordial understanding of truth was simultaneously alive among them, even if pre-ontologically, and it even held its own against the concealment implicit in their ontology-at least in Aristotle.xlll 226 Aristotle never defends the thesis that the primordial 'locus' of truth is in the judgment. He says rather that the .\oyos is that way of Being in which Dasein can either uncover or cover up. This double possibility is what is distinctive in the Being-true of the .\6yos: the .\&yos is that way of comporting oneself which can also cover things up. And because Aristotle never upheld the thesis we have mentioned, he was also never in a 1 ' ••• interpretiert aber das Phanomen als Vorhandenes auf seine miigliche Vorhandenheit.'
I. 6 Being and Time situation to 'broaden' the conception of truth in the .\&yos- to include pure voEi:v. The truth of ata87Jats- and of the seeing of 'ideas' is the primordial kind of uncovering. And only because V07JG'S' primarily uncovers, can the .:\&yos- as 8£avo£i:v also have uncovering as its function. Not only is it wrong to invoke Aristotle for the thesis that the genuine 'locus' of truth lies in the judgment; even in its content this thesis fails to recognize the structure of truth. Assertion is not the primary 'locus' of truth. On the contrary, whether as a mode in which uncoveredness is appropriated or as a way of Being-in-the-world, assertion is grounded in Dasein's uncovering, or rather in its disclosedness. The most primordial 'truth' is the 'locus' of assertion; it is the ontological condition for the possibility that assertions can be either true or false--that they may uncover or cover things up. Truth, understood in the most primordial sense, belongs to the basic constitution of Dasein. The term signifies an existentiale. But herewith we have already sketched out our answers to the question of what kind of Being truth possesses, and to the question of in what sense it is necessary to presuppose that 'there is truth'.
Not that old chestnut.
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Old 02-18-2018, 10:49 PM
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Originally Posted by eripiomundus View Post
After reading "The Red Pill" thread and watching a few links to the Sam Harris and Jordan Peterson podcast, I thought it might be interesting to talk about truth.

My position: there is no truth except this sentence but, for practical purposes, it is reasonable to behave as if there were.
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Old 02-18-2018, 11:59 PM
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Truth? Truth???
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Old 02-19-2018, 02:20 AM
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Originally Posted by brianpatrick View Post
Sounds silly, but I just put my hand down my pants and scratched my balls. That’s a fact. And my telling you that is a truth.


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A potential fact becomes a fact only when it is objectively verified. I didn't see you scratch. I've never seen your balls. I can't verify this as a fact, and therefore I don't know it as a truth.

@Blue: I'm in a rush to get some sleep right now - have to get up early - but I'll read the quote tomorrow, and look forward to your thoughts.
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Old 02-19-2018, 03:13 AM
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Originally Posted by eripiomundus View Post
A potential fact becomes a fact only when it is objectively verified. I didn't see you scratch. I've never seen your balls. I can't verify this as a fact, and therefore I don't know it as a truth.



@Blue: I'm in a rush to get some sleep right now - have to get up early - but I'll read the quote tomorrow, and look forward to your thoughts.


But the truth for you still exists somewhere. I could send you a video of the incident and we would then both know it as true.


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Old 02-19-2018, 05:21 AM
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If you send me a video there's no way I could know, with utter certainty, that it was genuine. Video compositing is easier than ever these days.

You believe you scratched your balls, and for you it might be true, but for everyone reading this it's only probable. Is a truth really true if only one person can verify it? If the answer is yes, why do we consider those with delusions and hallucinations to be having false experiences? Their auditory/visual/tactile/olfactory/gustatory experiences are true for them - they're really hearing voices - but there's no external evidence to support calling the things they see/hear/etc true in any objective way.

I'm just being a pain in the ass right now to be honest, but there are deeper arguments to be had here.
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Old 02-19-2018, 05:24 AM
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Originally Posted by eripiomundus View Post

Is a truth really true if only one person can verify it? If the answer is yes, why do we consider those with delusions and hallucinations to be having false experiences? Their auditory/visual/tactile/olfactory/gustatory experiences are true for them - they're really hearing voices - but there's no external evidence to support calling the things they see/hear/etc true in any objective way.

I'm just being a pain in the ass right now to be honest, but there are deeper arguments to be had here.
Scientific orthodoxy refuses to accept what it calls 'anecdotal' evidence, ie the evidence of one person's senses, unless it confirms what science accepts to be true.
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Old 02-19-2018, 05:31 AM
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Exactly my point. But the question then becomes: is it possible for two people to ever have exactly the same experience? I would argue "no".

If no two people can have the exact same experience how can anyone ever verify the so-called truth of another? They can only ever verify a semblance, and since a fact requires (at the least) multiple confirmations to be accepted as fact, there can be no objective/universal truth in the abstract realm.
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Old 02-19-2018, 07:17 PM
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I think I may have come up with a logical proof from whence we can approach the question of truth. This proof rests on four presuppositions:


1. Reality is synonymous with the universe
2. Matter and energy are all already created
3. There are no blank spaces in reality (that is to say there is no place reality does not exist)
4. Reality is a sucession of interactions between particle wave distributions


Accepting these presuppositions we can say that the uttermost verge of the universe is in agreement with its center and with any other locality insomuch as they all obey the same physical laws and act in concert.

Because there is no anterior to the present there is no duplication of matter and so that matter after having left a state cannot regain that state save in the near impossibility of the spontaneous entropic reversal. Since the movement of a quark on one end of the universe will eventually affect the entire universe we can say that the action is preserved in its effect on other objects. Moreover this effect cannot be erased or forgotten. That is to say that even if the action is negated then the negation is the proof of its existence and the effect of the negation travels also down through time in like manner.

Thus we can confidently say that there is a foundation for truth in the chain of action and reaction.

Later this week Ill move on to what I think is the real subject of this thread. Certainty. Whether or not we can be certain in our assertions.
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Old 02-19-2018, 08:05 PM
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Truth is what we believe it to be and there is no one single truth, it is all true.
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Old 02-19-2018, 08:21 PM
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Thought experiment. A landlord who noticing the rising prices of rent in his neighborhood suddenly comes under the conviction that his current tenets have not paid the preceding three months rent or violated some term of contract and so justifies their eviction. When presented with evidence contrary to his belief he maintains that it is false, will under no circumstances let his belief be contradicted. If no truth has objective primacy why should my truth not be as I wish it and aligned to my own interests?

If as you say everything is true then nothing can be true else everything would be infinitely self-contradicting. Reality itself would be impossible. Under your system 2+2={...-1, 0, 1, 2, 3...}

Obviously this cannot be.
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Old 02-19-2018, 09:37 PM
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[QUOTE=bluewpc; If no truth has objective primacy why should my truth not be as I wish it and aligned to my own interests?

Therein lies the truth. If you believe something is true then for you it is. Parse it with semantics or some esoteric analysis steeped in the folds of intellectualism if wished but the simple truth is what is true to us, regardless of what others may believe.

You believe your post is the truth but I believe mine is true.

Obviously this can be.
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Old 02-20-2018, 12:31 AM
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Originally Posted by bluewpc View Post
I think I may have come up with a logical proof from whence we can approach the question of truth. This proof rests on four presuppositions:


1. Reality is synonymous with the universe
2. Matter and energy are all already created
3. There are no blank spaces in reality (that is to say there is no place reality does not exist)
4. Reality is a sucession of interactions between particle wave distributions
I think this is begging the question: if you assume the above four points to be true you are already assuming the position that truth exists, and you're essentially proving a given. We first have to establish that the presuppositions are, in fact, true. Having said that, I liked your thinking in this. It's novel, and worth discussing regardless. I'll start with the suppositions:

1. I'm inclined to question this because reality cannot be known to us except via our own subjective experience of it, which is to some degree only an interpretation of what is really there. While I agree that reality, the ultimate unfiltered reality we presume exists independent of human interpretation, must logically be synonymous with the universe, it is impossible for a human being to have experience of this reality, and we cannot therefore confirm it as fact. We can only posit it as likely, probable. This doesn't mean your argument cannot 'logically' prove truth, but it does mean that it cannot prove truth outright.

2. The law of conservation of energy suggests this is the case. I don't want to dwell too much on the presuppositions, so I'll leave this one be.

3. This is very probable.

4. I think this point has the capacity to logically contradict the previous point: if even empty space, devoid of matter or waves, still constitutes reality (as per 3), then all reality cannot be comprised of wave/particle interactions because some reality is comprised of empty space. Maybe there are no such regions of empty space, but there might be... What surrounded the singularity that became the big bang? Empty space I guess. The radiation/matter in the universe is still expanding, so presumably it is expanding into empty space.

Accepting these presuppositions we can say that the uttermost verge of the universe is in agreement with its center and with any other locality insomuch as they all obey the same physical laws and act in concert.
Do they act in concert? I otherwise agree.

Because there is no anterior to the present there is no duplication of matter and so that matter after having left a state cannot regain that state save in the near impossibility of the spontaneous entropic reversal. Since the movement of a quark on one end of the universe will eventually affect the entire universe we can say that the action is preserved in its effect on other objects. Moreover this effect cannot be erased or forgotten. That is to say that even if the action is negated then the negation is the proof of its existence and the effect of the negation travels also down through time in like manner.

Thus we can confidently say that there is a foundation for truth in the chain of action and reaction.
Nice. Reminds of a cryptocurrency block-chain.

If we take the universe as an entire unit I think this argument is pretty good. My issue would be with proving it beyond a thought experiment - it is, by it's very nature, unprovable. The chain of action/reaction cannot be known except in its entirety - you can only reverse engineer the course of events in a system if you know the current state of ALL variables within. If you are an observer within the system, you cannot be simultaneously observing and reversing your own causal chain, meaning we can literally never prove this. If the logical proof is physically unprovable it cannot serve as an acceptable standard for establishing quantifiable truth.

[/QUOTE]Later this week Ill move on to what I think is the real subject of this thread. Certainty. Whether or not we can be certain in our assertions.[/QUOTE]

Truth and certainty are intimately entwined: you cannot have truth without certainty and you cannot have certainty without truth. They basically describe the same thing.
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Old 02-20-2018, 12:53 AM
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Originally Posted by eripiomundus View Post
I think this is begging the question: if you assume the above four points to be true you are already assuming the position that truth exists, and you're essentially proving a given. We first have to establish that the presuppositions are, in fact, true. Having said that, I liked your thinking in this. It's novel, and worth discussing regardless. I'll start with the suppositions:

1. I'm inclined to question this because reality cannot be known to us except via our own subjective experience of it, which is to some degree only an interpretation of what is really there. While I agree that reality, the ultimate unfiltered reality we presume exists independent of human interpretation, must logically be synonymous with the universe, it is impossible for a human being to have experience of this reality, and we cannot therefore confirm it as fact. We can only posit it as likely, probable. This doesn't mean your argument cannot 'logically' prove truth, but it does mean that it cannot prove truth outright.

2. The law of conservation of energy suggests this is the case. I don't want to dwell too much on the presuppositions, so I'll leave this one be.

3. This is very probable.

4. I think this point has the capacity to logically contradict the previous point: if even empty space, devoid of matter or waves, still constitutes reality (as per 3), then all reality cannot be comprised of wave/particle interactions because some reality is comprised of empty space. Maybe there are no such regions of empty space, but there might be... What surrounded the singularity that became the big bang? Empty space I guess. The radiation/matter in the universe is still expanding, so presumably it is expanding into empty space.

Do they act in concert? I otherwise agree.

Nice. Reminds of a cryptocurrency block-chain.

If we take the universe as an entire unit I think this argument is pretty good. My issue would be with proving it beyond a thought experiment - it is, by it's very nature, unprovable. The chain of action/reaction cannot be known except in its entirety - you can only reverse engineer the course of events in a system if you know the current state of ALL variables within. If you are an observer within the system, you cannot be simultaneously observing and reversing your own causal chain, meaning we can literally never prove this. If the logical proof is physically unprovable it cannot serve as an acceptable standard for establishing quantifiable truth.
Later this week Ill move on to what I think is the real subject of this thread. Certainty. Whether or not we can be certain in our assertions.
Truth and certainty are intimately entwined: you cannot have truth without certainty and you cannot have certainty without truth. They basically describe the same thing.
What about;

“I cannot swallow 50 gallons of ice cream in one peristaltic contraction?”

The interesting thing is this is written negatively as an absolute truth, and therefore any denying of the actions or the objects existence also backs up the argument that it is true.
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Old 02-20-2018, 01:46 AM
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OK so categories:

1. Truths out in the universe which are timeless. If we lost ALL our scientific knowledge tomorrow we could rediscover some of these truths given time because they would still exist with or without our knowledge of them.

2. Of all these truths in category 1, we can verify some of them through the scientific method. These are our collection of truths which have survived our testing, admittedly some will be discarded and reinvented, some will be wrong... but they belong to a different category because of their subjection to the method.

Of these at least some truly belong in the 2nd and 1st category.

If we really have to say that humans cannot access objective truth through the scientific method then we can distinguish this truth as empirical. Seems semantic to me but either way is fine, so long as we acknowledge that there really is a difference between things which are and things which are not verifiable.

3. Logical truths, these are just our ideas which logically follow. Like it's best not to build a society based on theft. This isn't in the universe, it's not objective, it's just something we're better off not doing, logically.
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Old 02-20-2018, 02:10 AM
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Originally Posted by PickleBottom View Post
What about;

“I cannot swallow 50 gallons of ice cream in one peristaltic contraction?”

The interesting thing is this is written negatively as an absolute truth, and therefore any denying of the actions or the objects existence also backs up the argument that it is true.
Technically a peristaltic contraction would occur whilst walking (wouldn't it?), and has nothing really to do with swallowing. I don't think your logic follows that denying the actions/objects asserts the argument's truth:

The argument, which defines an action/object relation as impossible, is either true or not. If we accept the elements as true the assertion is true. If we accept any of the elements as untrue the assertion is not true, but this does not mean the opposite is automatically true: that we "can" swallow 50 gallons... Proving an assertion false does not automatically render the opposite assertion true.

But let's get back to whether this assertion can be certain of truth:
For me subjective truth is meaningless. If you cannot communicate it to someone who affirms it there is no real truth, only subjectie experience. Truth is a veritable phenomenon. For your assertion to be true it would have to hold for various observers, so people woul have to see you try and fail to swallow 50 gallons of ice cream. But would that be convincing? Maybe you just didn't try hard enough. Maybe you didn't "put your body on the line" for the sake of philosophical star-gazing? Yes it seems reasonable to suppose you are incapable of the feat, but the highly probable and the absolute are eons apart.

The real issue here though is the limitation of this truth to a single person: "you". When you limit a truth in this way you relegate it to subjective truth. It's not necessarily applicable to all similar circumstances. It's more a personal truth than a truth that holds true across several conscious observers.

I guess I never specified "objective truth" in the initial post, and perhaps I should have, but I'll reiterate something I said earlier: we don't consider the delusions and hallucinations of a schizophrenic "true", even though they are true to that person. Truth, to me, is something that is or can be affirmed by anyone who wishes (and has the resources) to affirm it.
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Old 02-20-2018, 02:35 AM
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Apologies for the double post.

This is the main point I was hoping to eventually get to: truth is not a thing, but a concept. It is a conscious affirmation of sensory data. Truth requires not merely the experience, but a conscious acknowledgement of that experience. The reason I contend there can be no truth is because concepts are not concrete interpersonally verifiable phenomena, but merely subjective and interpersonally differential constructs. There is no way to prove two conceptual impressions are exactly akin between two people, and it's incredibly unlikely, given the incredible complexity of neuro-dendritic networks, that two concepts ever could be exactly the same.

An unconscious animal knows no truth. It experiences reality without any faculty to assert anything about it. It’s reality is neither true or false, but just is. We, on the other hand, can consider our experiences. Truth occurs not when we touch something, but when we become conscious of the touching, when we assert something about it.

Since consciousness is entirely subjective, and truth is a conscious assertion, truth can never be more than subjective, and any assertion of objective truth attests only to conscious experiences that approximate one another closely enough that, for all practical purposes, it is reasonable to call them truth.
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Old 02-20-2018, 02:53 AM
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Originally Posted by eripiomundus View Post
Since consciousness is entirely subjective, and truth is a conscious assertion, truth can never be more than subjective, and any assertion of objective truth attests only to conscious experiences that approximate one another closely enough that, for all practical purposes, it is reasonable to call them truth.
I'm cool with that.

Though I'd add that it's not just reasonable to call it truth, it IS what we call truth. Conscious experiences which approximate to one another so closely as to be universally repeatable ad infinitum is what we call truth.

When we say there is no truth what I hear is 'there are no conscious experiences which approximate to one another so closely as to be universally repeatable ad infinitum.'
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Old 02-20-2018, 10:39 AM
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@eri Id say the presuppositions are a priori because at least without 3&4 reality cant be sustained and I consider reality to be truth itself that reality is in agreement with itself. And heres the breakoff point between living and nonliving matter in my opinion is that it is possible for hte former to have an erroneous perception of reality. So in my definition truth is comprised of two categories, objective and subjective, the latter predicated on the first.

Also there is actually no such thing as empty space:

https://curiosity.com/topics/empty-s...nce-curiosity/

http://scienceblogs.com/startswithab...erse-combined/

But that does raise an interesting question if you could have truly empty space, where nothing is and no laws reign, than would that mean that the laws of physics are not integral to the universe but an overlay? God I wish I could live to see that question answered.

Next what I mean by acting in concert is that there is no cosmic pause button. Even the passage of time is dependent on speed relative to light the communication of information never suffers a caesura.
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Old 02-20-2018, 12:33 PM
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Originally Posted by eripiomundus View Post
Technically a peristaltic contraction would occur whilst walking (wouldn't it?), and has nothing really to do with swallowing. I don't think your logic follows that denying the actions/objects asserts the argument's truth:

The argument, which defines an action/object relation as impossible, is either true or not. If we accept the elements as true the assertion is true. If we accept any of the elements as untrue the assertion is not true, but this does not mean the opposite is automatically true: that we "can" swallow 50 gallons... Proving an assertion false does not automatically render the opposite assertion true.

But let's get back to whether this assertion can be certain of truth:
For me subjective truth is meaningless. If you cannot communicate it to someone who affirms it there is no real truth, only subjectie experience. Truth is a veritable phenomenon. For your assertion to be true it would have to hold for various observers, so people woul have to see you try and fail to swallow 50 gallons of ice cream. But would that be convincing? Maybe you just didn't try hard enough. Maybe you didn't "put your body on the line" for the sake of philosophical star-gazing? Yes it seems reasonable to suppose you are incapable of the feat, but the highly probable and the absolute are eons apart.

The real issue here though is the limitation of this truth to a single person: "you". When you limit a truth in this way you relegate it to subjective truth. It's not necessarily applicable to all similar circumstances. It's more a personal truth than a truth that holds true across several conscious observers.

I guess I never specified "objective truth" in the initial post, and perhaps I should have, but I'll reiterate something I said earlier: we don't consider the delusions and hallucinations of a schizophrenic "true", even though they are true to that person. Truth, to me, is something that is or can be affirmed by anyone who wishes (and has the resources) to affirm it.
I’m definitely not stating the opposite is true, only that any kind of solipsism or sophism can only bolster the truth of my statement, because the statement is made negatively, secondly once you ask for evidence you have created a paradigm for truth, and therefore do admit a way to test truth, which would be easy to prove because basically all I’m stating is that a larger unit cannot fit into a smaller unit, thus also bolstering my argument.
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Old 02-20-2018, 05:49 PM
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Old 02-20-2018, 11:24 PM
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Originally Posted by bluewpc View Post
@eri Id say the presuppositions are a priori because at least without 3&4 reality cant be sustained and I consider reality to be truth itself that reality is in agreement with itself.
Does antimatter factor into this agreement?
And heres the breakoff point between living and nonliving matter in my opinion is that it is possible for hte former to have an erroneous perception of reality. So in my definition truth is comprised of two categories, objective and subjective, the latter predicated on the first.
I see what you're saying, and on one level I agree with the categories, but:

Ultimately "truth" is a conscious thing. It is not synonymous with reality, but is a judgement thereupon. What you're calling objective truth is in fact reality. Truth can only emerge via a conscious affirmation of that reality. It's when the historically derived constructs of a consciousness accord with a given stimuli - when something we experience accords with what we already know. Therefore truth requires a conscious observer, and the objective truth you're talking about is impossible.

Had a quick look at the links - have seen similar material before. What these people are measuring isn't the kind of space I alluded to. The space between, say, our sun and another star is full of criss-crossing waves of all manner, and teeming with energy, but what of the space into which the furthest remnants of the big bang is still fleeing? The first photon of light that escaped the big bang is still fleeing the event at light speed, but into what? Unless scientists have found a means to overtake light that has been moving faster than us for some 14 billion years and then take measurements f the space into which that light is escaping, I don't think we can rule out perfectly empty space. The notion of the big bang states that all matter/energy/waves originated from the singularity. If there were no matter/energy/waves prior, then there must have been empty space surrounding it, no?

But that does raise an interesting question if you could have truly empty space, where nothing is and no laws reign, than would that mean that the laws of physics are not integral to the universe but an overlay? God I wish I could live to see that question answered.
I've always thought of the laws applying only to energy/matter/waves anyway. When these elements enter into a void they take their rules with them. In empty space you don't need rules - there is nothing to apply them to.

Next what I mean by acting in concert is that there is no cosmic pause button. Even the passage of time is dependent on speed relative to light the communication of information never suffers a caesura.
I've got an alternative thought on time I wouldn't mind your thoughts on:

I always had a problem with the notion of a space-time continuum. It seemed strange to take a real phenomenon - space - and form a continuum with a man-made concept - time. So I asked "what is time?". It dawned on me that time is entirely dependent on change. Without change no hands rotate on a clock, no radio-isotopes decay, no planets rotate on their axes...

So time, I've come to think, is the measurement of change. But it's not that simple. Everything changes. Even rocks are slowly changing at the quantum level. Time is therefore really the measurement of change relative to change: rotations of the second hand per increments of the minute hand per increments of the hour. Change in state of an egg per sand through an egg timer. Rotations of the earth on its axis per orbits of the sun...

Once I thought of time as a measurement of change a space-time continuum made perfect sense:

1. Space without change is meaningless
2. Change without space is impossible

1 - If nothing changes, there is no meaning in the universe, for no information flows - no light reaches the eye, no particles the nose, longitudinal waves don't reach the ears, etc.

2 - Change, even at the quantum level, can only occur in space.

Therefore there is an intimate relationship between time and space. Time is only the alteration of space, after all.
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Old 02-20-2018, 11:38 PM
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Originally Posted by PickleBottom View Post
I’m definitely not stating the opposite is true, only that any kind of solipsism or sophism can only bolster the truth of my statement, because the statement is made negatively, secondly once you ask for evidence you have created a paradigm for truth, and therefore do admit a way to test truth, which would be easy to prove because basically all I’m stating is that a larger unit cannot fit into a smaller unit, thus also bolstering my argument.
I thought your question about the ice cream was a joke when I first read it, which is why I never replied (sorry), but to be honest it has proven pretty difficult to address. I wrote out a reply earlier, but had to abandon it because something still didn't feel right. I'll leave it for my subconscious to dwell on for a while longer I think.

Apologies for misconstruing your statement regarding the denial of any element of your argument proving it true. I do see what you mean: if I deny there is 50 gallons of ice cream then the statement is still true because you cannot eat what you do not have.
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Old 02-22-2018, 07:19 PM
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